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1 Introduction
Knowledge and its management is of crucial importance for a firm’s inventiveness and, hence, is
essential for its sustainable competitive advantage. In general, knowledge itself has both, an internal
as well as an external dimension. For instance, firms can increase their own knowledge stock by
either investing in product or process R&D, or both. However, theoretically, a firm can also exploit
external sources of knowledge produced by its competitors. Ironically, new knowledge - accessed
externally or internally - also generates types of knowledge barriers which may hinder the firm to
exploit the accumulated and existing stock of knowledge (Caldwell (1967)).
The knowledge barrier is also subject of research in knowledge management.1 In general and
applied to an economic setting, the knowledge barrier refers to any impediment that prevents ex-
isting knowledge to be used elsewhere. This interpretation is inline with Attewell’s (1992) view on
knowledge barriers as the absence of ability accessing existing knowledge. Knowledge barriers are
relevant within the firm as well as with respect to knowledge external to the firm. The former one is
also known as internal stickiness (Szulanski (1996,2003)).2 Inline with this somehow vague concept
of knowledge barriers, we consider anything that prevents existing knowledge to be applied, trans-
ferred, shared or diffused. We take account of these barriers in our theoretical approach at several
instances whenever existing knowledge affects the economic environment of the firm. We distinguish
explicitly between barriers in accessing internal and external existing knowledge.
Following the knowledge management literature, the reduction of knowledge barriers goes hand
in hand with improving knowledge transfer and knowledge sharing. While the latter is usually focusing
on what is happening inside the firm, the former is often applied to knowledge at a higher aggregated
level containing also inter-business relations (Choo and Alvarenga Neto (2010)). To reduce knowl-
edge barriers, the relevant economic literature suggests to foster the firm-specific, underlying learn-
ing process and, thereby to increase the firms’ absorption capacities (Cohen an Levinthal (1990)).
Lichtenthaler (2009) considers a firm’s absorption capacity as important to transform knowledge into
innovations for improved products and production processes. Inline with the concept of "a learning
economy" proposed by Lundvall and Johnson (1994), we argue that a conditio sine qua non to re-
duce the firm’s knowledge barriers is learning. Linking this to the knowledge management literature,
learning includes sharing and transferring knowledge from where it is originating towards where it can
contribute to productivity. This interpretation is inline with Demircioglu and Audretsch (2017) pointing
out that learning can be seen as a critical dimension reducing the knowledge barrier. However, the
authors also highlight that more research is needed to explore the link between knowledge barriers
and innovation. Our paper not only exactly adds to this issue, but goes a step further by asking
1A comprehensive review of the knowledge management review is beyond the scope of this section. We just report on
the influential contributions in this strand of the literature.
2An example could be the successful implementation of a new technology by one department within the firm while the
other department is unable to do so due to lack of expertise and lack of knowledge that particular problems have already
been solved at other instances inside the firm.
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whether or not a reduction of the knowledge barrier is beneficial for welfare.
In our setting, we focus on a very abstract form of learning without specifying the learning process
itself. For instance, a direct effect of learning is reflected in a reduction of innovation costs. This might
happen if a firm successfully makes use of its own accumulated knowledge through sharing it within
the firm. As a second effect, learning also increases the accumulation of knowledge within the firm
which is again related to knowledge sharing. Further, learning makes it also easier to benefit from
external knowledge spillovers which would typically be seen as a knowledge transfer.
(Strategic) investment decisions (in knowledge) always have a dynamic dimension as today’s de-
cisions in most cases affect the conditions for future investments.3 In recent years, some efforts have
been made to discuss the inherently dynamic nature of product and process improvement, ranging
from the specific patterns of R&D races, to the timing of innovative ventures, to spillover effects. For
example, Lambertini and Mantovani (2009) focused on the dynamic behavior of a multiproduct mo-
nopolist investing in process and product innovation, whereas Lambertini and Orsini (2015), Li and Ni
(2016) or more recently, Zhong and Zhang (2018) consider a monopolist investing in cost-reducing
and quality-enhancing endeavors. Common to the latter mentioned strand of literature is the re-
sult that due to the monopoly power on product quality, the firm distorts product quality downwards
compared to what is optimal from a social point of view. However, none of the before mentioned
literature has analyzed the dynamic adjustment of welfare due to a potential unforeseen shock in the
knowledge barrier sphere represented by unforeseen changes at one of the several instances where
knowledge is shared or transferred. Consequently, also none of the mentioned contributions dis-
cussed the optimal policy design aiming to increase product quality towards the optimal level, when
external and internal knowledge transfers and sharing are present.
Process and product innovations differ without doubt. We distinguish them by introducing a
product innovation specific cost component to the monopolist. Additionally, a product innovation boils
down to an increase in the consumers marginal utility. Inline with the literature, we refer to this as an
improvement in the monopolist’s product quality. Such innovations are subject to a scale independent
production cost component. This will give rise to scale effect in product quality which is exploited by
the monopolists market power. As the existing literature almost entirely focus on the role of scale in
process innovations (see e.g. Cohen and Klepper (1996a,b)), little attention has been paid to the role
of scale in product innovations.
This paper exactly fills the mentioned gaps. First, we combine the dynamic models introduced
by Lambertini and Orsini (2015), Li and Ni (2016) and Zhong and Zhang (2018) and, inter alia,
solve the control problem for the monopolist’s offered equilibrium product quality. We show that this
obtained hyperbolic equilibrium is a degenerate saddle implying that there exists a path to which
the economy converges in the long-run. We find that product quality increases with a decreasing
knowledge barrier. Next, we compute the social optimal solution. We find that the social optimal level
3In contrast, recently, Deng and Hendrikse (2018) investigate the role of social interactions for product quality in a static
environment.
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of product quality is higher due to under-investments in product quality in the decentralized setting.
However, the level of process R&D is socially optimal, which is inline with the literature.4 Hence,
in order to establish the first-best solution, we propose a policy imposing a product R&D subsidy
scheme which is completely lump-sum financed by the consumers.
The paper makes the following important points. (i) We find that the higher the optimal, long-
run subsidy-rate is, the lower is the knowledge barrier. For instance, a lower knowledge barrier
allows for better accessing existing knowledge. This increases product quality today but, and this
is important, for a given depreciation rate, product quality decreases in the future as private R&D
endeavors decrease. Obviously, a higher subsidy then counteracts the lower private incentive to
invest in own product R&D due to a low knowledge barrier. Further, only in the long-run where product
quality is constant, the optimal subsidy-rate is constant as well. During the transitional phase towards
the steady-state, the optimal subsidy is time-varying. (ii) Performing a numerical simulation study, we
show that welfare may considerably differ in the short-run from its long-run counterpart. This latter
finding has important policy implications: If policy makers focus on the short-run welfare effects of
lowering the knowledge barrier, the policy recommendation which may be optimal in the long-run can
be biased in the short-run. Hence, welfare effects in the short-run may differ considerably from those
in the long-run as speculated by Audretsch, Baumol and Burke (1995). To clarify on this issue, we run
several numerical simulations of our model over its transition towards the long-run equilibrium. We
find heterogeneity with respect to the effects of knowledge barrier reductions across different types
of barriers as well as during the short and the long-run. Additionally, we find R&D policy to provoke
different welfare reactions in the short and long-run as well. As will be seen, market size plays an
important role in all the mentioned effects.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and solves for the monopolist’s
long-run equilibrium. The stability properties of this equilibrium are worked out in Section 3. Section 4
provides our welfare analysis, whereas Section 5 establishes the welfare optimal R&D policy. Section
6 focuses on the transitional dynamics of welfare effects due to knowledge barrier shocks and R&D
subsidies. Section 7 finally concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Consumers
In what follows, we derive a dynamic extension of the static Mussa and Rosen (1978) framework.
Let us consider a single-product monopoly which sells a non-durable good of quality q(t) at a price
p(t) over a continuous time span t ∈ [0,∞+]. Following Lambertini (2018), Lambertini and Orsini
(2015) or Zhong and Zhang (2018), the marginal willingness to pay θ ∈ [Θ − 1,Θ] with Θ > 1 is
4This latter finding is due to the fact that the monopoly price does not depend on the marginal cost of production and,
further, market demand does not respond to changes in marginal costs.
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uniformly distributed with a density function d, d ≥ 1. Hence, the total mass of consumers is d ≥ 1
which is at the same time also representing market size. Assuming further that the market is fully
covered at any time t ∈ [0,∞+]5, the net-utility of a representative consumer purchasing a single
unit of the good at quality q(t) is given by:
U = θq(t)− p(t)≥ 0. (1)
Under full market coverage, we have that x(t) = d and the profit-maximizing price pm(t) completely
extracts the surplus from the poorest consumer, i.e. pm(t) = (Θ− 1)q(t).
2.2 In-house product and process innovation
We assume that the monopoly carries out the entire R&D activities in-house. At any t ∈ [0,∞+],
the monopoly has to set the levels of product and process innovations simultaneously. Following
Chenavaz (2012), product innovations increase the cumulative level of product quality q(t), while
investments in the production process decrease the cumulative production costs c(t) accordingly.
Hence, the dynamics of q(t) and c(t) can be fully described by the following system of differential
equations:
q˙(t)≡ ∂ q(t)
∂ t
= [k(t)−δ]q(t), (2)
c˙(t)≡ ∂ c(t)
∂ t
= − [h(t)−η] c(t), (3)
with k(t) and h(t) as the R&D efforts in product and process improvements, respectively. δ ∈
(0,1) is the constant depreciation rate on product quality, while η ∈ (0, 1) represents the production
technology’s obsolescence rate.
Both, q(t) and c(t), are state variables in our problem. Increasing product quality at one par-
ticular instance in time also has influence on quality’s entire future path. An increment in quality is
therefore an investment with instantaneous as well as future returns. If k(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0,∞+]
would be chosen, quality would decay down to zero in the very long run. The same property applies
in general to the costs c(t). Of course, the sign of effects demands for a different interpretation.
Without steady investments into cost reductions beyond the obsolescence rate, costs c(t) would di-
verge to infinity. Hence, production costs as well as the level of product quality require maintenance
in the long run.
We assume the monopoly’s total cost function C(t) at any t ∈ [0,∞+] reads as:
C(t) = c(t)x(t) +αk2(t) + βh2(t) + γq(t)2, (4)
5The assumption of a fully covered market can be justified with a demand size which is known a priori due to a full
information assumption which enables the firm to identify the position Θ− 1 of the marginal consumer.
#2001 Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation
Knowledge transfer, transitional dynamics and optimal Research & Development
policy in a dynamic monopoly setting
6 / 28
with x(t) as the firm’s output. The second, third and fourth term of equation (4) show the R&D costs
in product and process R&D as well as the costs implied by the chosen product quality, respectively.
We assume these costs to follow a quadratic representation to reflect their distinctive character when
compared with ordinary marginal costs in production. The choice of a quadratic representation is
inline with the related literature. While marginal costs c(t) are independent of scale in general,
the other terms reflect increasing marginal cost contributions in the respective dimensions. Costs
increase more than proportional in the chosen gross investments into quality improvement and cost
reductions as well as the level of quality at which production takes place. These three components
are giving rise to a technology with quasi-fixed costs. This also justifies the monopolistic market
environment chosen in this contribution.
As costs depend on the level of quality q(t) in a quadratic way, product innovations have a
distinguishing feature in our set-up as compared with process innovations. This term will introduce a
scale effect as will be seen further down below. The larger the market for the monopolist’s product,
the higher will be the chosen level of quality.
2.3 Knowledge accumulation
We follow Li and Ni (2016) or Zhong and Zhang (2018) and stipulate that knowledge is created by
process and product innovations and accumulates according to the following rules:
Ak(t) = A¯k +σk
∫ t
0
k(s)ds−ωk
∫ t
0
Ak(s)ds, (5)
Ah(t) = A¯h +σh
∫ t
0
h(s)ds−ωh
∫ t
0
Ah(s)ds. (6)
A¯i > 0 for i = {h, k} represents an externally given knowledge stock. ωi ∈ (0,1) denote the
depreciation rates on accumulated knowledge. This mirrors the view of Jorgenson (1973), Griliches
(1998) and others that new ideas replace older ones as they become obsolete. σi ∈ (0,1) denote
the knowledge accumulation rates arising from investments in product and process innovations. σi
are part of our approach modeling the knowledge barrier: Larger values for σi reduce the knowledge
barrier. At this particular instance, we try to reflect the within firm dimension of the knowledge barrier.
This specific barrier limits the amount of the firm’s knowledge stock that can be gained from the
innovative actions representing pieces of knowledge required to raise quality or reduce costs. This
additionally refers to knowledge sharing within the firm familiar from the literature on knowledge
management. At this point, we also link learning abilities with knowledge barriers as mentioned in
the introduction. Increasingσi may represent an increase in learning efforts.
6 As such, learning effort
6As mentioned in the introduction, we desist from modeling a specific learning process as this would not deliver new
insights for the paper’s topic and, hence, is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. However, an avenue for further research
would be to introduce different forms of (endogenous) learning to the model and discuss the influence of (endogenous)
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is helpful in reducing the knowledge barrier at this particular point in the firm’s knowledge creation
process.
2.4 External knowledge spillover
There is by now a voluminous literature pointing to the importance of knowledge spillovers for R&D
endeavors, both at the firm as well as at the macroeconomic level (among others, see Audretsch
(1995), Audretsch and Feldman (1996) or Acs et al. (2013)). It is straightforward to incorporate
knowledge spillovers in our dynamic setting which, at the same time, also represent knowledge trans-
fers from external sources as discussed in the knowledge management literature. We assume that
the external, and hence, exogenous sources of knowledge and their internal counterparts are per-
fect substitutes. Unlike in Klarl (2014), there is no knowledge spillover across product and process
innovations which implies that the monopolists cannot exploit the process R&D knowledge stock to
increase product quality and vice versa.7 We follow Cellini and Lambertini (2009) and re-express the
state dynamics of q(t) and c(t) in the following way:
q˙(t)≡ ∂ q(t)
∂ t
= [k(t)−δ+ κk k˜(t)]q(t), (7)
c˙(t)≡ ∂ c(t)
∂ t
= −[h(t)−η+ κhh˜(t)]c(t), (8)
where the parameter κi , i = {h, k} measures the positive knowledge transfers that the monopolist
receives from external knowledge sources. For simplicity, we assume that external investments k˜(t)
and h˜(t) grow at an exogenous, constant net rate gi−ςi , i = h, k, where gi ∈ (0,1) (ςi ∈ (0,1)) rep-
resent the external knowledge accumulation (depreciation) rate. This is the second instance where
we introduce the knowledge barrier to our problem. Obviously, a larger value of κi can be interpreted
as a reduction in this dimension of the knowledge barrier leading to a better transfer of knowledge
from external sources towards the firm.
2.5 Internal learning by doing
We already take account of knowledge sharing within the monopolist’s firm at the stage of accumulat-
ing knowledge (see equations (5) and (6)). This, however, represents knowledge sharing in a rather
incomplete way as the monopolist might also draw on the level of accumulated knowledge. This will
happen whenever something can be learned from the accumulated experiences represented in the
model by Ah(t) and Ak(t). As we believe that this is reasonably the case, we follow Thompson (2010)
and Clarke et al. (1982), among others, in assuming that learning from in-house knowledge stocks
learning on product quality and (transitional) welfare.
7This may be seen as a strict assumption but reduces the analytical complexity of our model without losing important
insights.
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immediately reduces R&D costs. Hence at any t ∈ [0,∞+], the monopolist’s total cost function has
to be adjusted in the following manner (see Li and Ni (2016)):
C(t) = c(t)x(t) +αk2(t)−τkΓk(t) + βh2(t)−τhΓh + γq(t)2, (9)
where τi ∈ (0, 1), i = {h, k} denote the cost reducing impact of the monopolist’s accumulated
knowledge in excess of the externally available knowledge stock. This excess knowledge is given by
the knowledge-gaps
Γk(t) ≡ Ak(t)− A¯k, (10)
Γh(t) ≡ Ah(t)− A¯h. (11)
The impact of the knowledge-gaps on total production costs is limited again by the knowledge
barrier. As both, internally accumulated and external knowledge stocks affect production costs, τi
refers to the ability of knowledge sharing and transfer. We interpret this as a learning rate from firm
specific knowledge acquired by product and process innovations translating into lower firm specific
production costs. Obviously and ceteris paribus, larger knowledge-gaps lead to larger cost-saving
potentials. Thus, besides κi and σi , τi are the last elements representing the various aspects of the
knowledge barrier in our set-up.
2.6 The monopolist’s problem
The objective of the monopolist is to set the optimal level of investments in product and process R&D
which in turn maximizes the discounted profit flow, Π(t). Thus, the monopolist’s problem can be
expressed as:
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max{k(t),h(t)}Π(t) ≡
∫ ∞+
0
pi(t)exp[−ρt]d t (12)
s.t.
pi(t) = [(Θ− 1)q(t)− c(t)]d − [αk2(t)−τkΓk]− [βh2(t)−τhΓh]− γq(t)2,
q˙(t) = [k(t)−δ+ κk k˜(t)]q(t), c˙(t) = −[h(t)−η+κhh˜(t)]c(t),
A˙k(t) = σkk(t)−ωkAk(t), A˙h(t) = σhh(t)−ωhAh(t),
Γk(t) = Ak(t)− A¯k, Γh(t) = Ah(t)− A¯h,
˙˜k(t) = [gk − ςk]k˜(t), ˙˜h(t) = [gh − ςh]h˜(t),
k˜(0) = k˜0 > 0, h˜(0) = h˜0 > 0,
q(0) = q0 > 0, c(0) = c0 ∈ (0, (Θ− 1)q(0)),
Ak(0) = A¯k > 0, Ah(0) = A¯h > 0,
(13)
and the appropriate transversality conditions which are specified below. In order to guarantee that
the market is fully covered even at t = 0, we have to impose an initial condition on the marginal
costs, c(0). This imposition guarantees that the marginal costs are strictly lower than the spending
of the poorest consumer existing in the market.
2.7 Equilibrium
The firm’s current value HamiltonianH is given by:
H = {(Θ− 1)[q(t)− c(t)]d − [αk2(t)−τkΓk]− [βh2(t)−τhΓh]− γq(t)2
+ λ1(t)[(k(t)−δ+ κk k˜(t))q(t)]
+ λ2(t)[−(h(t)−η+κhh˜(t))c(t)]
+ λ3(t)[σkk(t)−ωkAk(t)]
+ λ4(t)[σhh(t)−ωhAh(t)]
+ λ5(t)(gk − ςk)k˜(t)
+ λ6(t)(gh − ςh)h˜(t)},
where λi for i = {1, ..., 6} are the costate variables associated with q, c,Ak,Ah, k˜ and h˜. Hence-
forth, we shall omit the indication of the time argument t for the sake of brevity whenever no confusion
can arise. Here, we assume that the initial condition for c(0) is fulfilled right from the beginning. The
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first order conditions (FOCs) for the controls k,h and costate equations are:
k : −2αk+λ1q+λ3σk = 0, (14)
h : −2βh−λ2c +λ4σh = 0, (15)
λ1 : λ˙1 = (ρ−k+δ− κk k˜)λ1 − (Θ− 1)d + 2qγ, (16)
λ2 : λ˙2 = (ρ + h+κhh˜−η)λ2 + d, (17)
λ3 : λ˙3 = (ρ +ωk)λ3 −τk, (18)
λ4 : λ˙4 = (ρ +ωh)λ4 −τh, (19)
λ5 : λ˙5 = −κkqλ1 − (gk − ςk −ρ),λ5 (20)
λ6 : λ˙6 = +κhcλ2 − (gh − ςh −ρ)λ6.. (21)
The corresponding transversality conditions are given by:
limt→∞λ1(t)q(t)exp (−ρt) = 0, limt→∞λ2(t)c(t)exp (−ρt) = 0, limt→∞λ3(t)Ak(t) exp (−ρt) =
0, limt→∞λ4(t)Ah(t)exp (−ρt) = 0, limt→∞λ5(t)k˜(t)exp (−ρt) = 0, and limt→∞λ6(t)h˜(t)exp (−ρt) =
0.
The transversality conditions make sure that neither knowledge nor product and process innova-
tions are accumulated by an inefficiently high or low degree as time goes by.
From equations (14)-(15) we obtain for the optimal controls:8
k∗ = max
0, λ1q+

τk
ρ+ωk

σk
2α
 , (22)
h∗ = max
0, −λ2c +

τh
ρ+ωh

σh
2β
 , (23)
as well as the control equations by differentiating (22) and (23) with respect to time:
k˙ =
q˙λ1 + qλ˙1
2α
, (24)
h˙ = − c˙λ2 + cλ˙2
2β
. (25)
Using (7), (18) and (14) in (24) and (8), (19) and (15) in (25) gives:
8See Appendix A for details on the derivations.
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k˙ = ρ

k− τkσk
2α(ρ +ωk)

− (Θ− 1)dq
2α
+
2q2γ
2α
, (26)
h˙ = ρ

h− τhσh
2β(ρ +ωh)

− cd
2β
. (27)
The system consisting of equations (26)-(27) and (7)-(8) establishes a system of differential equa-
tions which allows us to study the dynamic relationship between R&D investments in product and
process innovations, product quality, and production costs when external knowledge spillovers and
in-house learning by doing are present. This system ([S1]) can be formally comprised as:
[S1]

k˙ = ρ

k− τkσk2α(ρ+ωk)
− (Θ−1)dq2α + 2q2γ2α ,
h˙= ρ

h− τhσh2β(ρ+ωh)
− cd2β ,
q˙ = (k−δ+κk k˜)q,
c˙ = −(h−η+ κhh˜)c.
(28)
For the sake of simplicity and keeping analytical complexity at a reasonable minimum, we assume
that k˜ and h˜ are constant over time. This requires either gi − ζi = 0 or gi = 0 and ζi = 0 for
i = {k,h} and does not affect the overall findings this paper makes. Requiring that the steady state
is time-invariant, i.e. c˙ = q˙ = k˙ = h˙ = 0, solving system [S1] together with A˙k = A˙h = 0 delivers
six possible sets of solutions of which only one is economically sensible. We hereby exclude corner
solutions, such as zero product quality in the steady state9. This solution ([Sol1]) reads as:
[Sol1]

qsts =
p
(ρ+ωk)(8γρσkτk+(ρ+ωk)(d2(Θ−1)2−16αγδρ+16αγκk k˜ρ))
ρ+ωk
+d(Θ−1)
4γ ,
csts = ρd

2β(η− h˜κh)− σhτhρ+ωh

,
ksts = δ− k˜κk,
hsts = η− h˜κh,
Astsk =
σk(δ−k˜κk)
ωk
,
Astsh =
σh(η−h˜κh)
ωh
,
(29)
and non-zero given steady state values h˜sts and k˜sts. Reflecting [Sol1], the constraints
τh < τ¯h ≡ 2β
 
η− h˜κh

(ρ +ωh)
σh
, (30)
τk > τ¯k ≡ 2α
 
δ− k˜κk

(ρ +ωk)
σk
(31)
9The explicit expressions for all solutions are available from the authors upon request. Only the real valued solutions
are economically meaningful and are discussed here.
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need to be satisfied simultaneously in order to obtain positive and real-valued values for process as
well as for product R&D investments.10 To understand the conditions, it is helpful to rewrite the critical
values τ¯h and τ¯k by using [Sol1] for the steady-state investments as
τ¯h
σh
ρ +ωh
= 2αksts,
τ¯k
σh
ρ +ωh
= 2βhsts.
The critical values are the values for τh and τk that would exactly balance the long-run marginal
benefits and marginal investment costs for process and product innovations. The left hand side of
each of the equations represents respectively the quality contribution or cost reduction through the
long-run knowledge contribution of a marginal unit of investment σiρ+ωi , i = {h, k} and its knowledge
transfer/sharing effect via τ¯i . The right hand side of the equations clearly represent the costs of a
marginal unit of investments into process and product innovation. At the critical values for τh and
τk, marginal long-run benefits and marginal investment costs need to equal each other. However,
(31) implies τk to be larger than its critical value, i.e. marginal long-run benefits outweigh marginal
investment investment costs. This is due the additional negative contribution of the quality level on
overall costs C and the additional positive effect as a higher quality level increases the monopolists
revenues at the total scale of production. In the optimum, the former contribution is outweighing the
latter. τk > τ¯k balances the net additional contributions of investments into product innovations.
If the condition would be violated, the monopolist wouldn’t have an incentive to invest into product
innovations in steady-state.
τh needs to be smaller than τ¯h. This applies as there is an additional positive contribution of
process innovations. They reduce the monopolist’s marginal production costs, and hence, contribute
to profits at the total scale of production. This is causing the profit maximizing allocation to tolerate
a knowledge sharing/transfer effect below its critical value τ¯h. If the condition would be violated, the
monopolist could drive marginal costs in production down to or even below zero.
As the obtained steady-state results are similar to Lambertini and Orsini (2015) or Zhong and
Zhang (2018), we desists from discussing the properties of the steady-state but refer to this relevant
literature. However, for what follows, it is worth noting that the constant steady-state product quality
qsts given by [Sol1] increases with a reduction of the knowledge barrier and the size of the market d.
3 Stability analysis
In this section we show that our equilibrium point is a degenerate saddle-point. This implies that
starting from a historical point, there exists a path on which the economy converges to a steady-
state. To show this, we first linearize our model around [Sol1]. Let x be the (6 × 1) vector x ′ =
10The condition for τk is a sufficiency condition guaranteeing a real valued quality level respectively of Θ and d.
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[q, c, k,h,Ak,Ah] and let us define J6×6 = D f (xSol1) as the Jacobian matrix of the system evalu-
ated at the equilibrium point [Sol1]. Hence, the linearized counterpart of [S1] reads as x˙ = J x with
x ∈ R6.
J ≡

∂ c˙
∂ c
∂ c˙
∂ q
∂ c˙
∂ Ak
∂ c˙
∂ Ah
∂ c˙
∂ k
∂ c˙
∂ h
∂ q˙
∂ c
∂ q˙
∂ q
∂ q˙
∂ Ak
∂ q˙
∂ Ah
∂ q˙
∂ k
∂ q˙
∂ h
∂ A˙k
∂ c
∂ A˙k
∂ q
∂ A˙k
∂ Ak
∂ A˙k
∂ Ah
∂ A˙k
∂ k
∂ A˙k
∂ h
∂ A˙h
∂ c
∂ A˙h
∂ q
∂ A˙h
∂ Ak
∂ A˙h
∂ Ah
∂ A˙h
∂ k
∂ A˙h
∂ h
∂ k˙
∂ c
∂ k˙
∂ q
∂ k˙
∂ Ak
∂ k˙
∂ Ah
∂ k˙
∂ k
∂ k˙
∂ h
∂ h˙
∂ c
∂ h˙
∂ q
∂ h˙
∂ Ak
∂ h˙
∂ Ah
∂ h˙
∂ k
∂ h˙
∂ h

(32)
=

0 0 0 0 0 −c
0 0 0 0 q 0
0 0 −ωk 0 σk 0
0 0 0 −ωh 0 σh
0 4qγ−(Θ−1)d2α 0 0 ρ 0
− d2β 0 0 0 0 ρ

.
For positive values of [Sol1], the six Eigenvalues of J associated with [Sol1] are real-valued.11 It
can be shown that four of them are negative valued, whereas two of them are positive. We can show
that [Sol1] fulfills the properties of a hyperbolic equilibrium point. In general, a hyperbolic equilibrium
point is a fixed point that does not have any center manifolds.12 For this fixed point, it can be shown
that there exists a locally stable and unstable manifold. Further, according to the Hartman-Grobman
theorem (see Teschl (2012), chapter 9.2. and 9.3), the behavior of a dynamical system in the domain
near a hyperbolic equilibrium point is qualitatively the same as the behavior of its linearization near
this equilibrium point due to its topological equivalence. Hence, from the Hartman-Grobman theorem
and the stable manifold theorem we can deduce that [Sol1] is a hyperbolic equilibrium point which is
a (degenerate) saddle (see also Buiter (1984)).
4 Welfare
In this section we focus on the welfare consequences of an unanticipated shock to the knowledge
barrier. We assume a benevolent social planner running the firm and, hence, being in charge of
choosing the R&D investment paths for product and process innovation that maximize the discounted,
intertemporal social welfare. Social welfare (sw(t)) is defined as the sum of consumer surplus (cs(t))
11See Appendix A for details related to the Eigenvalues.
12This is due to the fact that none of our Eigenvalues is zero valued.
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and the profit stream (pi(t)). For cs(t), we obtain:
cs(t) :=
∫ Θ
Θ−1
(θq(t)− p(t))dθ = q(t)
2
. (33)
Thus, sw(t) can be re-expressed as:
sw(t) :=
q(t)[1+ 2d(Θ− 1)− 2γq(t)]
2
− c(t)d−[αk2(t)−τkΓk(t)]−[βh2(t)−τhΓh(t)]. (34)
Therefore, the planner’s current value Hamiltonian is given by:
H = {q(t)[1+ 2d(Θ− 1)− 2γq(t)]
2
− c(t)d − [αk2(t)−τkΓk(t)]− [βh2(t)−τhΓh(t)]
+ λ1(t)[(k(t)−δ+ κk k˜(t))q(t)]
+ λ2(t)[−(h(t)−η+κhh˜(t))c(t)]
+ λ3(t)[σkk(t)−ω1Ak(t)] (35)
+ λ4(t)[σhh(t)−ω2Ah(t)]
+ λ5(t)(gk − ςk)k˜(t)
+ λ6(t)(gh − ςh)h˜(t)},
where λi(t) for i = {1, ..., 6} are the costate variables associated with q, c,Ak,Ah, k˜ and h˜. Applying
the same apparatus as during the derivation of the decentralized solution, again, we can establish a
system of differential equations which allows us to study the dynamics between R&D investments in
product and process innovations, product quality, and production costs.13 This system ([S2]) can be
formally written as:
[S2]

k˙ = ρ

k− τkσk2α(ρ+ωk)
− (Θ−1)dq2α + q2α  2qγ− 12 ,
h˙= ρ

h− τhσh2β(ρ+ωh)
− cd2β ,
q˙ = (k−δ+κk k˜)q,
c˙ = −(h−η+κhh˜)c.
(36)
Again requiring that the steady-state is time-invariant, we obtain six possible sets of solutions of which
only one is economically sensible. Further, this solution is a degenerate saddle-point where the same
rational applies as in the case analyzed in Section 3. Comparing the social optimal outcome with the
decentralized one, with the exemption of the product quality, q, and investments in product quality, k,
it turns out that this solution coincides with [Sol1]. The optimal quality level, qm, turns out to be:
13See Appendix B for details on the derivations.
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qm =
1+ 2d(Θ− 1) +
q
(ρ+ωk)(32γρσkτk+(ρ+ωk)((2d(Θ−1)+1)2−64αγδρ+64αγκk k˜ρ))
ρ+ωk
8γ
. (37)
Inspecting the expressions for qm and qsts in [Sol1] and (37) reveals that qm is always exceeding
qsts as long the latter is positive valued (condition (31)). Thus, we observe a general under-supply
of product quality in the decentralized economy. Compared to the benevolent social planner, the
monopolist chooses a non-optimal level of product R&D investments.
This can be easily seen by solving each of the k˙ equations in [S1] and [S2] for the stationary
solution of k given one particular level of quality q. Denote the solutions by ksts(q) and km(q), we
find the difference ∆k(q) := km(q)− ksts(q) = q4αρ > 0. This is identical to the result in Lambertini
and Orsini (2015).
The driving force behind the quality under-supply in the decentralized setting is the absence of
the consumer surplus in the monopolist’s objective function. On the contrary, the level of process
innovations is socially efficient as the monopoly price p is not a function of the marginal costs and
that the market demand is invariant to changes in the latter.
5 Optimal R&D policy
In the last section, we have shown that from a welfare point of view, the monopolist’s profit incentives
cause a downward distortion of product quality. Hence, the immediate question arises, as to which
policy can establish the optimal level of product R&D that establishes the optimal product quality
level in the decentralized setting. We assume the policy maker to introduce a lump-sum financed
R&D subsidy tax scheme with a subsidy rate ξ(t) ∈ (0,1). Hence, the costs for setting up a R&D
lab reduce to αk2(1−ξ). We would like to emphasize here that the subsidy rate might well vary with
t . It is straightforward that this finding implies that short-run welfare effects (during transition) of a
public financed R&D subsidy significantly differs from its long-run counterpart. We will return to this
point later.
Solving the monopolists profit maximization problem, we can show that the (second-best) subsidy-
adjusted equilibrium level of R&D investments in product quality, ksub, are given in steady-state as:14
ksub =
q (ρ +ωk) (d(Θ− 1)− 2γq) +ρσkτk
2αρ(1− ξ) (ρ +ωk) . (38)
Hence, comparing equation (38) with the optimal level of product R&D, km, and solving for the subsidy
14See Appendix C for details in the derivations.
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rate ξ by using the optimal solution for qm, we arrive at the optimal product R&D subsidy rate, ξopt :
ξopt(σk,τk,κk, ·) = q
m (ρ +ωk)
qm (ρ +ωk) (2d(Θ− 1)− 4γqm + 1) + 2ρσkτk = (39)
=
2d(Θ− 1)ρ +ωk(2d(Θ− 1) + 1) +ρ +pΨ
32αγρ (ρ +ωk)
 
δ−κk k˜
 , (40)
withΨ ≡ (ρ +ωk)
 
32γρσkτk + (ρ +ωk)
 
(2d(Θ− 1) + 1)2 − 64αγρ  δ− κk k˜ . Note that
for τ¯k < τ < ¯¯τk with ¯¯τk ≡ 4α(ρ+ωk)(δ−κ1 k˜)(8αγρ(δ−κk k˜)+d(1−Θ))σk (see equation (31)), it always holds
that ξopt ∈ (0,1). Furthermore, Ψ is increasing in d and therefore ξopt(σk,τk,κk, ·) is increasing
in market size. The optimal subsidy policy is, thus, more pronounced if the monopolist is active in
smaller markets with less demand. Policy should target its subsidy policy on R&D in product innova-
tions towards those firms contributing to consumers’ surplus but suffering at the same time from low
market volumes.
Taken together, these findings guide the following proposition:
Proposition
1. The subsidy rate ξopt(σk,τk,κk, ·) positively depends on the rate of knowledge accumulation,
σk, the product innovations’ learning rate, τk, as well as on the knowledge spillover rate, κk.
2. The subsidy rate never turns into a tax (i.e. ξ < 0) as long as k ≥ 0⇔ δ ≥ k˜κk provided
that Θ > 1.
3. Only along the steady-state, the subsidy rate is constant over time as the steady-state level
of product quality is constant as well. However, during transition, the optimal subsidy rate is
time-varying in a non-linear fashion with the level of product quality.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Hence, the last proposition tells that a reduction of the knowledge barrier implies a higher R&D
subsidy given the product quality is below the social optimal. A reduction in the knowledge barrier
related to knowledge spillovers κk reduces, ceteris paribus, steady-state investments in product inno-
vations. This happens as the monopolist drives down own (costly) investments and partially replaces
them by (cost less) external knowledge. As external knowledge is carrying a zero price, the reduction
outweighs the additional external knowledge available due to the decreased knowledge barrier.
This has an additional effect on the impact of a subsidy on the quality level chosen by the mo-
nopolist. As investments in product innovations are reduced in case of a lower knowledge barrier, the
implied cost reduction for the monopolist is more than proportionate as marginal investments cost
are increasing. The discussed subsidy scheme targets exactly these costs and hence becomes less
effective as its marginal impact is reduced by the non-linearity in investment costs (quadratic in our
case).
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A reduction in the knowledge barrier related to σk and τk has similar effects on the effectiveness
of the subsidy scheme. The lower knowledge barrier increases the social optimum quality level (see
(37)) which causes due to quadratic investment cost more than proportionate higher costs in produc-
tion. Consequently, the optimal subsidy rate has to increase to provide an appropriate incentive for
the monopolist.
6 Transitional dynamics
The main impetus of this paper is to persuade the reader that unexpected, knowledge barrier related
shocks, such as shocks to the learning rate or to knowledge spillover have not only long-run, but
also short-run welfare consequences. Hence, a policy maker with a pure long-run focus arrives at a
misleading policy design for the short-run when it comes to a mitigation of such shocks only in the
long-run.
To make this last point clear, we shock the decentralized economy and investigate the short and
long-run welfare consequences. We do so by following the transitional dynamics considering differ-
ent assumptions with respect to the market size d. As argued above, market size is an important
factor influencing the optimal R&D policy. To simulate the entire welfare transition path, we employ
the relaxation algorithm suggested by Trimborn et al. (2008). Whether or not welfare increases
or decreases depends the (competing) forces of the consumer and producer surplus, respectively.
Hence, the impetus of this simulation study is not to calibrate the model to real-world data, which
is clearly beyond the scope of this contribution, but to persuade the reader that a welfare analysis
focusing exclusively on the long-run would be incomplete.15 Due to the fact that process R&D invest-
ment incentives are optimally chosen in the decentralized economy, we only focus on those parts of
the knowledge barrier related to product R&D investments and the subsidy policy targeting product
quality.16.
6.1 Parameter values
The chosen parameter space has to meet the parameter restrictions worked out above which ensure
an economically meaningful equilibrium for our economy. Table (1) shows the parameter choice as
well as the shock size expressed as percentage changes, respectively.
In total, we run four simulations each considering three different values for d. They show the
welfare consequences of an unanticipated positive knowledge spillover shock (∆κk > 0), an unan-
ticipated positive knowledge accumulation rate shock (∆σk > 0), an unanticipated positive learning
15Of course it is an interesting task to apply this model for a specific industry and discussing the transitional dynamic
responses of shocking a specific parameter value. We leave this as a task for future research.
16The results from the analysis investigating the knowledge barrier related to process innovations can be obtained from
the authors upon request. In general, the qualitative findings for welfare by a reduction of the process R&D-related knowl-
edge barriers are similar.
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Benchmark economy
Evolution of product quality q(t)
δ = 0.02 κk = 0.21 k˜(t) = k˜ = 0.02 A¯k = 0.0001
Evolution of production cost c(t)
η= 0.90 κh = 0.10 h˜(t) = h˜= 0.70 A¯h = 0.0001
Evolution of product R&D investments k(t)
τk = 0.10 σk = 0.20 α= 0.80 ωk = 0.01 γ= 0.05
Evolution of process R&D investments h(t)
τh = 0.11 σh = 0.12 β = 0.90 ωh = 0.01
Structural parameter
ρ = 0.06 Θ = 1.10 d ∈ {1.10,1.20, 1.30} ξ= 0.00
Shock size (in percentage points)
∆ξ= 0.10 ∆τk = 0.10 ∆σk = 0.10 ∆κk = 0.10
Table 1: Parameter calibration for the benchmark economy
rate shock (∆τk > 0) as well as the welfare response of an unanticipated positive R&D subsidy
shock (∆ξ > 0). Without loss of generality we assume that h˜ and k˜ are constant over time as
in the theoretical analysis above. It is important to note that we also assume that the shocks last
forever, i.e. a shocked parameter does not return to its original value. For all simulation runs, we
report the relative difference as compared with the benchmark economy (Table 1). According to our
stability analysis, after the shock, the economy converges towards its new steady-state. Finally, for
all scenarios, the calibration guarantees that product quality is below the optimal level.
6.2 Results from simulation
Figure (1) shows the welfare change during transition. For every shock scenario, Table (2) shows
the welfare change in the short- and in the long-run. Throughout transition, shocks to τk and σk
have positive effects on welfare (see panels (b) and (c)). Increasing σk enhances the accumulation
of knowledge while increasing τk improves on internal learning. Both imply cost reducing effects in
the simulated scenarios which have positive effects on welfare. Looking at the effects taking account
of market size uncovers that effects are stronger if the market size is smaller.
Adjustment after an unanticipated knowledge spillovers shock follows a different pattern (panel
(d) in Figure (1). As κk increases, the monopolists enjoys a higher rate of knowledge spillovers or
external knowledge transfers. The subsequent reaction will be to reduce investments in product inno-
vation which then leads to lower knowledge accumulation. Therefore, the knowledge gap will decline
and, hence, production cost will increase. In the short-run, we see a positive effect on welfare. This
happens as the reduction in investments have an instantaneous effect of reducing costs. R&D costs
are quadratic in k and lower investment, thus, initially reduce the total costs of the monopolist. After a
while, however, the negative consequences of lower investments become visible. The negative effect
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Welfare changes: short-run vs. long-run
Shock Short-run (sw(0)) Long-run
d = 1.1 d = 1.2 d = 1.3 d = 1.1 d = 1.2 d = 1.3
∆ξ= 0.10 -0.00072 -0.00064 -0.00057 0.05437 0.04858 0.043551
∆τk = 0.10 102.371 96.8549 91.7787 108.109 102.023 96.4438
∆σk = 0.10 -0.05505 -0.04829 -0.04257 4.50211 4.11803 3.77754
∆κk = 0.10 0.00396 0.00379 0.00363 -0.32550 -0.31154 -0.29833
Table 2: Short vs. long-run absolute welfare changes relative to the new steady-state
on accumulated knowledge now outweighs the instantaneous cost reduction and overall production
costs increase. The total welfare effect now becomes negative. Again, we find effects to be more
pronounced in smaller markets.
The welfare effects of the subsidy are negative in the very short-run and positive afterwards as
expected as can be seen from panel (a) in Figure (1)). The reason is again to be found in the time
lag between an investment in product quality R&D and its effect on production costs. Investment im-
plies instantaneous (quadratic) cost while cost reductions will be significant only after corresponding
knowledge accumulation took place. Once this has happened, welfare is improving however. Looking
at the market size, once more smaller markets imply stronger effects.
To sum up, the purpose of this simulation study is to show that, first, shocks to the knowledge
barrier might have heterogeneous effects and, second, that the introduction of product innovation
R&D subsidies potentially have very distinct effects in the short and in the log-run. Besides this,
market size is a crucial factor influencing the results. If market size d is small, the quasi fixed cost
implied by R&D influence the behavior of the monopolist to a great extend as they are large relative
to total turnover. This needs to be kept in mind during policy making together with the finding that
initial short-run effects of policy might be considerably different from their long run counterparts.
Although our analysis considers a stationary d, this might of special importance to policy considering
innovative ideas suffering initially from a small market size.
7 Conclusion
Based on a dynamic monopoly setting with simultaneous investment decisions in process as well
as in product R&D, the main impetus of the paper is to show that a reduction of the knowledge
barrier due to long-lasting shocks has ambiguous welfare consequences: With the "standard" focus
solely on the long-run, welfare effects are ambiguous as welfare directly depends on the calibrated
parameter space. If the focus is both on the short- and on the long-run, a simulation study highlights
that short-run welfare effects may completely differ from their long-run counterparts. This is due to
the fact that a knowledge barrier shock triggers the monopolist to sub-optimally lower its product
R&D investments today at the cost of lower future levels of knowledge. Hence, this finding has an
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1: Welfare change at time t defined as the change of welfare relative to the new steady-state
welfare level
important policy-implication: If a policy maker focuses on the short-run welfare effects of a decrease
of the knowledge barrier, the policy recommendation which might be optimal in the long-run could be
biased in the short-run.
In this contribution we focus on the product R&D sphere as, in contrast to the process R&D
investment sphere, the optimal solution for the product quality differs from the social optimal one.
Hence, we discuss the implementation of a consumer financed R&D subsidy which aims to realize the
social optimal product quality level. We find that in the short-run, this R&D subsidy rate is time-varying
with the level of product quality and only constant in the long-run. We also find that the R&D subsidy
rate is higher, the lower the knowledge barrier is. Market size is a crucial factor for policy making
as well. Smaller markets are benefiting relatively more from subsidy policies. At the same time,
innovative monopolies are also in general stronger affected by knowledge barriers. This stresses
our argument from the introductory section that product innovations should be discussed along with
process innovations in the context of market size and should not be left out of this discussion.
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Appendix
A: Monopolist’s problem
The FOCs (18) and (19) allow for a closed form solution for λ3(t) and λ4(t). Rewrite these conditions
as
λ˙ j(t) + f j(t) = g j(t), j = {3,4},
with
f j(t) = −(ρ +ωi), g j(t) = −τi , i = {k,h},
we find
λ j(t) = λ j(0)exp

−
∫ t
0
f j(s)ds

+
∫ t
0
g j(z)exp

−
∫ t
z
f j(s)ds

dz.
This delivers
λ3(t) =
τk
ρ +ωk
+ exp[(ρ +ωk)t]

λ3(0)− τk
ρ +ωk

, (41)
λ4(t) =
τh
ρ +ωh
+ exp[(ρ +ωh)t]

λ4(0)− τh
ρ +ωh

. (42)
With k˜(t) and h˜(t) constant, the steady-state fulfills c˙(t) = q˙(t) = k˙(t) = h˙(t) = A˙k(t) =
A˙h(t) = 0. In a non-degenerate equilibrium, we need to have limt→∞ Ai(t) = Astsi with Astsi > 0
and finite.
The transversality conditions for Ai(t) therefore imply
limt→∞ exp[−ρt]λ j(t)Ai(t) = Astsi limt→∞ exp[−ρt]λ j(t) = 0. Using (41) and (42) then gives
exp[−ρt]λ3(t) = exp[−ρt] τk
ρ +ωk
+ exp[ωk t]

λ3(0)− τk
ρ +ωk

,
exp[−ρt]λ4(t) = exp[−ρt] τh
ρ +ωh
+ exp[ωh t]

λ4(0)− τh
ρ +ωh

.
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Hence, the transversality conditions for Ak(t) and Ah(t) require λ3(t) =
τk
ρ+ωk
and λ4(t) =
τh
ρ+ωh
for all t as λ3(t) and λ4(t) otherwise explode or degenerate towards zero. Inserting these
results into (16) and (17) respectively, gives the optimal controls in (22) and (23).
The Eigenvalues µi , i ∈ 1, ..., 6 of the Jacobian J are given by
µ1 = −ωk, µ2 = −ωh,
µ3 =
1
2

ρ −
p
α2β(βρ2+2cstsd)
αβ

, µ4 =
1
2

ρ −
p
αβ2(αρ2+2qsts(d(1−θ )+4γqsts))
αβ

,
µ5 =
1
2

ρ +
p
α2β(βρ2+2cstsd)
αβ

, µ6 =
1
2

ρ +
p
αβ2(αρ2+2qsts(d(1−θ )+4γqsts))
αβ

.
Note that µ1 < 0, µ2 < 0, µ3 < 0 for τh < τ¯h, µ4 < 0 for τk > τ¯k, µ5 > 0 for τh > τ¯h and
µ6 > 0 for τh > τ¯h where τ¯h, τ¯k are given by (30) and (31).
B: Centralized solution
Given the Hamiltonian (35), the FOCs read as
k : −2αk+λ1q+λ3σk = 0, (43)
h : −2βh−λ2c +λ4σh = 0, (44)
λ1 : λ˙1 = (ρ − k+δ−κk k˜)λ1 − (Θ− 1)d + 2qγ− 12 , (45)
λ2 : λ˙2 = (ρ + h+κhh˜−η)λ2 + d, (46)
λ3 : λ˙3 = (ρ +ωk)λ3 −τk, (47)
λ4 : λ˙4 = (ρ +ωh)λ4 −τh, (48)
λ5 : λ˙5 = −κkqλ1 − (gk − ςk −ρ),λ5 (49)
λ6 : λ˙6 = +κhcλ2 − (gh − ςh −ρ)λ6. (50)
The corresponding transversality conditions are given by:
limt→∞λ1(t)q(t)exp (−ρt) = 0, limt→∞λ2(t)c(t)exp (−ρt) = 0, limt→∞λ3(t)Ak(t) exp (−ρt) =
0, limt→∞λ4(t)Ah(t)exp (−ρt) = 0, limt→∞λ5(t)k˜(t)exp (−ρt) = 0, and
limt→∞λ6(t)h˜(t)exp (−ρt) = 0.
We note that the FOCs in this case only differ by condition (45) from the FOCs in the decentralized
solution as only the term q(t)2 reflecting consumers’ surplus adds to the Hamiltonian.
Therefore, as in Appendix A, the co-states associated with Ak(t) and Ah(t) need to be constant
at λ3(t) =
τk
ρ+ωk
and λ4(t) =
τh
ρ+ωh
. Using these expressions for λ3(t) and λ4(t) in (43) and (44)
gives the same optimal controls as before ((22), (23))
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k∗ = max
0, λ1q+

τk
ρ+ωk

σk
2α
 , (51)
h∗ = max
0, −λ2c +

τh
ρ+ωh

σh
2β
 ,
implying
k˙ =
q˙λ1 + qλ˙1
2α
, (52)
h˙ = − c˙λ2 + cλ˙2
2β
. (53)
Using (7), (47) and (43) in (52) and (8), (48) and (44) in (53) gives the dynamic system [S2]:
[S2]

k˙ = ρ

k− τkσk2α(ρ+ωk)
− (Θ−1)dq2α + q2α  2qγ− 12α, (54)
h˙= ρ

h− τhσh2β(ρ+ωh)
− cd2β ,
q˙ = (k−δ+κk k˜)q, (55)
c˙ = −(h−η+ κhh˜)c,
where we note that the only difference between [S2] and [S1] is the additional far right term in the
first equation. The steady-state solution for the case c˙(t) = q˙(t) = k˙(t) = h˙(t) = A˙k(t) = A˙h(t) =
0 is then straightforward. Except for q, we find the same results as in case of the decentralized
equation. In particular, the steady-state quality level in the centralized equilibrium, qm is found by
solving for k in steady-state as in Appendix A by using (55) and inserting the result into (54) in
steady-state.
C: R&D policy
The Hamiltonian in this case reads as
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H = {(Θ− 1)[q(t)− c(t)]d − [(1− ξ(t))αk2(t)−τkΓk]− [βh2(t)−τhΓh]− γq(t)2
+ λ1(t)[(k(t)−δ+κk k˜(t))q(t)]
+ λ2(t)[−(h(t)−η+κhh˜(t))c(t)]
+ λ3(t)[σkk(t)−ωkAk(t)]
+ λ4(t)[σhh(t)−ωhAh(t)]
+ λ5(t)(gk − ςk)k˜(t)
+ λ6(t)(gh − ςh)h˜(t)},
where λi for i = {1, ..., 6} are the costate variables associated with q, c,Ak,Ah, k˜ and h˜. Suppressing
time arguments whenever possible, the first order conditions (FOCs) for the controls k,h and costate
equations read as:
k : −2(1− ξ)αk+λ1q+λ3σk = 0, (56)
h : −2βh−λ2c +λ4σh = 0, (57)
λ1 : λ˙1 = (ρ−k+δ− κk k˜)λ1 − (Θ− 1)d + 2qγ, (58)
λ2 : λ˙2 = (ρ + h+κhh˜−η)λ2 + d, (59)
λ3 : λ˙3 = (ρ +ωk)λ3 −τk, (60)
λ4 : λ˙4 = (ρ +ωh)λ4 −τh, (61)
λ5 : λ˙5 = −κkqλ1 − (gk − ςk −ρ),λ5 (62)
λ6 : λ˙6 = +κhcλ2 − (gh − ςh −ρ)λ6. (63)
The corresponding transversality conditions are given by:
limt→∞λ1(t)q(t)exp (−ρt) = 0, limt→∞λ2(t)c(t)exp (−ρt) = 0, limt→∞λ3(t)Ak(t) exp (−ρt) =
0, limt→∞λ4(t)Ah(t)exp (−ρt) = 0, limt→∞λ5(t)k˜(t)exp (−ρt) = 0, and
limt→∞λ6(t)h˜(t)exp (−ρt) = 0.
As in Appendices A and B, (60) and (61) together with the transversality conditions involving Ak
and Ah demand λ3 and λ4 to be constant for all t . Their values equal those in the preceding cases.
The optimal control ksub can be found by solving (56) for k and inserting λ3 =
τk
ρ+ωk
ksub =
λ1q
sub + σkτkωk+ρ
2α(1− ξ) , (64)
with qsub as the quality level resulting from the subsidy policy. Evaluating (58) in steady-state
with λ˙1 = 0 gives
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λ1 =
(Θ− 1)d
ρ
− 2γqsub
ρ
.
Inserting this into (64) gives ksub as in the main text as
ksub =
qsub (ρ +ωk) (d(Θ− 1)− 2γqsub) +ρσkτk
2αρ(1− ξ) (ρ +ωk) .
Returning to the case of the welfare optimum discussed in Appendix B, we find the optimal
investments into quality, km by solving, first, (46) for λ1 in steady-state with a constant level of quality
and constant corresponding investments. Inserting this result into (43) and solving for (an interior)
km gives
km =
qm(ρ +ωk)
 
d(Θ− 1)− 2γqm − 12

+ρσkτk
2αρ(ρ +ωk)
.
Equalizing this expression with ksub in (and demanding that the level of quality is identical to qm
leads to the optimal tax rate ξopt(σk,τk,κk, ·) as given in the main text by equation (39). Inserting
qm given by (37) into (39) finally delivers (40).
D: Proof of Propositions
1. ξopt(σk,τk,κk, ·) increases in σk, τk and κk : This follows directly as ξopt(σk,τk,κk, ·)
positively depends on Ψ which in turn depends positively on σk, τk and κk
2. ξopt(σk,τk,κk, ·) > 0 : From (40), this follows whenever δ − κk > 0 holds. Inspecting (39)
alternatively, reveals that we find a positive ξopt(σk,τk,κk, ·) in any case if 2d(Θ−1)−4γqm+1≥
0. This, however, is equal to the marginal increase in welfare due to quality changes in the social
optimum and, hence, cannot be negative
3. Subsidy time varying off the steady-state : Under the optimal subsidy scheme, the level of
quality q and investments into product innovations k need to replicate its welfare maximizing coun-
terparts. Equating the investments k fulfilling (64) and (51) respectively, and solving for the subsidy
rate gives
ξopt(σk,τk,κk, ·) = q λ
m
1 −λsub1
λm1 q+
σk
ρ+ωk
,
where λm1 and λ
sub
1 denote the shadow values of the quality level in the welfare optimum and
under the subsidy scheme. Note that they are not equal as the subsidy affects this implicit price for
quality. Differentiating this with respect to time leads to
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ξ˙opt(σk,τk,κk, ·)
ξopt(σk,τk,κk, ·) =
q˙
q
+
λ˙m1 − λ˙sub1
λm1 −λsub1
− λ˙
m
1 q+λ
m
1 q˙
λm1 q+
σk
ρ+ωk
,
where q˙ fulfills (55). Making use of (52) gives
ξ˙opt(σk,τk,κk, ·)
ξopt(σk,τk,κk, ·) =
q˙
q
+
λ˙m1 − λ˙sub1
λm1 −λsub1
− k˙
k
,
where k˙ fulfills (52). Using the FOCs (45) and (58) together with (55), the middle term on the
right hand side reads as
λ˙m1 − λ˙sub1
λm1 −λsub1
= ρ − 1
2(λm1 −λsub1 )
.
Hence,
ξ˙opt(σk,τk,κk, ·)
ξopt(σk,τk,κk, ·) =
q˙
q
+ρ − 1
2(λm1 −λsub1 )
− k˙
k
.
As the dynamics of the model imply transitional dynamics (see Section 3), all the terms in this
result are time varying. Consequently, the optimal subsidy rate shares this property
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